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Abstract
We consider the question of extending propositional logic to a logic of plausible
reasoning, and posit four requirements that any such extension should satisfy.
Each is a requirement that some property of classical propositional logic be
preserved in the extended logic; as such, the requirements are simpler and less
problematic than those used in Cox’s Theorem and its variants. As with Cox’s
Theorem, our requirements imply that the extended logic must be isomorphic
to (finite-set) probability theory. We also obtain specific numerical values for
the probabilities, recovering the classical definition of probability as a theorem,
with truth assignments that satisfy the premise playing the role of the “possible
cases.”
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1. Introduction
E. T. Jaynes [13, p. xxii] proposes the view that probability theory is the
uniquely determined extension of classical propositional logic (CPL) to a “logic
of plausible reasoning” :
Our theme is simply: probability theory as extended logic. . . . the
mathematical rules of probability theory are not merely rules for cal-
culating frequencies of ‘random variables’; they are also the unique
consistent rules for conducting inference (i.e. plausible reasoning) of
any kind. . .
This view is grounded in the work of Pólya [17] and Cox [9], especially the latter.
In this paper we aim to set the notion of probability theory as the necessary
extension of CPL on solid footing.
ISubmitted and currently under review at International Journal of Approximate Reason-
ing.
II c©2017. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.
Email address: vanhorn@adobe.com (Kevin S. Van Horn)
Preprint submitted to Elsevier
ar
X
iv
:1
70
6.
05
26
1v
1 
 [c
s.A
I] 
 16
 Ju
n 2
01
7
Our goal is to generalize the logical consequence relation, which deals only
in certitudes, to handle degrees of certainty. Whereas X |= A means that A (the
conclusion) is a logical consequence of X (the premise), we write A | X for “the
reasonable credibility of the proposition A (the query) when the proposition X
(the premise) is known to be true” (paraphrasing Cox [9].) We call (· | ·) the
plausibility function. If X |= A then A | X is some value indicating “certainly
true,” if X |= ¬A then A | X is some value indicating “certainly false,” and
otherwise A | X is a value indicating some intermediate level of plausibility.
Our task is to determine what the plausibility function must be, based on logical
criteria.
As a generalization of the logical consequence relation, the plausibility func-
tion must depend only on its two explicit arguments; the value it returns must
not depend on any additional information that varies according to the prob-
lem domain to which it is applied, nor according to the intended meanings of
the propositional symbols. This is a formal logical theory we are developing,
and so any intended semantics of the propositional symbols must be expressed
axiomatically in the premise.
One might question whether all relevant information for determining the
plausibility of some proposition A can be expressed in propositional form for
inclusion in the premise X. Might not our background information include
“soft” relationships, mere propensities for propositions to be associated in some
way? Although we provide some suggestive examples, we do not attempt to
resolve that question. Instead we ask, given that the background information
and intended semantics are expressed in propositional form and included in the
premise, with no other information available, what can we conclude about the
plausibility function?
We posit four Requirements for the plausibility function. Each of these
requires that some property of the logical consequence relation be retained in
the generalization to a plausibility function. Three are invariance properties,
and the fourth is a requirement to preserve distinctions in degree of plausibility
that already exist within CPL. These Requirements (discussed in detail later)
are the following:
R1. If X and Y are logically equivalent, and A and B are logically equivalent
assuming X, then A | X = B | Y (Section 4.)
R2. We may define a new propositional symbol without affecting the plausibility
of any proposition that does not mention that symbol. Specifically, if s
is a propositional symbol not appearing in A, X, or E, then A | X =
A | (s↔ E) ∧X (Section 5.)
R3. Adding irrelevant information to the premise does not affect the plausibility
of the query. Specifically, if Y is a satisfiable propositional formula that
uses no propositional symbol occurring in A or X, then A | X = A | Y ∧X
(Section 6.)
R4. The implication ordering is preserved: if X |= A→ B but not X |= B → A
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then A | X is a plausibility value that is strictly less than B | X (Section
7.)
Note that we do not assume that plausibility values are real numbers, nor that
they are totally ordered; R4 presumes only that there is some partial order on
plausibility values.
Given R1–R4, we prove that plausibilities are essentially probabilities in
disguise. Specifically, we show that
1. there is an order-preserving isomorphism P between the set of plausibility
values P and the set of rational probabilities Q ∩ [0, 1];
2. P (A | X), the plausibility A | X mapped via P to the unit interval, is
necessarily the ratio of the number of truth assignments that satisfy both
A and X to the number of truth assignments that satisfy X; and
3. hence the usual laws of probability follow as a consequence.
This identifies finite-set probability theory as the uniquely determined extension
of CPL to a logic of plausible reasoning.
The body of this paper is organized as follows:
• In Section 2 we compare this work to Cox’s Theorem and variants, as well
as Carnap’s system of logical probability.
• In Section 3 we review some notions from CPL, discuss the partial plau-
sibility ordering that already exists within CPL, and discuss the nature of
the plausibility function.
• Our main result is proven in Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7, which also introduce
the Requirements, discuss the motivation behind them, and explore some
of their consequences. Along the way we discuss how Carnap’s system
violates R3.
• In Section 8 we prove that R1–R4 are consistent.
• Section 9 discusses three topics: the connection of our results to the clas-
sical definition of probability, the issue of non-uniform probabilities, and
an initial attempt at extending our results to infinite domains.
2. Relation to Prior Work
To set the context for this paper, clarify our goals, and head off possible
misconceptions, we now review similar prior work and point out the differences.
2.1. Cox’s Theorem
R. T. Cox [9] proposes a handful of intuitively-appealing, qualitative require-
ments for any system of plausible reasoning, and shows that these requirements
imply that any such system is just probability theory in disguise. Specifically,
he shows that there is an order isomorphism between plausibilities and the unit
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interval [0, 1] such that A | X, after mapping from plausibilities to [0, 1], respects
the laws of probability.
Over the years Cox’s arguments have been refined by others [1, 13, 16, 20, 21],
making explicit some requirements that were only implicit in Cox’s original pre-
sentation, and replacing some of the requirements with slightly less demanding
assumptions than those used in Cox’s original proof. One version of the require-
ments [21] may be summarized as follows:
C1. A | X is a real number.
C2. A | X = A′ | X whenever A is logically equivalent to A′, and B | X ≤ A | X
for any tautology A.
C3. There exists a nonincreasing function S such that ¬A | X = S (A | X) for
all A and satisfiable X.
C4. The set of plausibility triples (y1, y2, y3) where y1 = A1 | X, y2 = A2 | A1∧X,
and y3 = A3 | A2 ∧A1 ∧X for some A1, A2, A3, and X, is dense in [0, 1]3.
C5. There exists a continuous function F : [f, t]2 → [f, t], strictly increasing in
both arguments on (f, t]2, such that A ∧B | X = F (A | B ∧X, B | X) for
any A, B, and satisfiable X. Here we use t , A | X for any tautology A,
and f , S (t).
These requirements have not been without controversy. For example, Shafer
[18] objects to C1, C3, and C5; Halpern [11, 12] questions C4; and Colyvan [8]
objects to C2 on the basis that it presumes the law of the excluded middle.
Our approach has no equivalent of C1, C3, C4, or C5:
• We are agnostic as to the set of allowed plausibility values. We do not
even require that plausibility values be totally ordered.
• We have no requirement on how the plausibility ¬A decomposes.
• We have no density requirement on plausibility values.
• We have no requirement on how the plausibility of A∧B decomposes, much
less any continuity or strictness requirements for such decompositions.
We do retain a variant of C2. Our goal is to extend the classical propositional
logic; we make no attempt to address intuitionistic logic.
Our requirements are all based on preserving in the extended logic some
existing property of CPL. Three of these are invariances—ways in which A or
X may be modified without altering A | X—and the last is a requirement
to preserve those distinctions in degree of plausibility already present in CPL.
We believe that such an approach leaves far less room for objections to the
requirements.
The results we obtain are similar to those of Cox’s Theorem, with these
differences:
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• We obtain an order isomorphism P between plausibility values and rational
probability values.
• We obtain specific numerical values for P (A | X), and not just the laws
for decomposing P (A | X).
• The conditioning information X is necessarily a propositional formula.
(Some variants [7, 13, 21] of Cox’s Theorem allow X to be an undefined
“state of information” to which we may add additional propositional in-
formation.)
• Our results apply only to finite problem domains or finite approximations
of infinite domains. (In Section 9.3 we discuss how to extend our results
to infinite domains.)
2.2. Clayton and Waddington: bridging the intution gap
In a recent paper, Clayton and Waddington [7] seek to “bridge the intuition
gap” in Cox’s Theorem by proposing alternative requirements they argue are
more intuitively reasonable, and then proving C4 and the strictness of F in C5
as theorems. We find their most interesting and important contributions to be
the following:
• Rather than just tweaking Cox’s Theorem, they have instead created an
entirely new proof of its result. The meat of the proof of Cox’s Theorem
lies in deriving functional equations that F and S must satisfy, then solving
those equations. But by the time they have “bridged the intuition gap” in
the requirements, they already have most of the proof completed, without
any need to solve functional equations.
• Jaynes [13] argues that, if one’s background information is “indifferent”
between two propositions, then they should be assigned equal plausibility.
They formalize this idea as an invariance principle: if A′ | X ′ is obtained
from A | X by consistently renaming all propositional symbols used via a
one-to-one mapping, then the two plausibilities are equal.
• Their proof yields the classical definition of probability—the ratio of the
number of positive cases to the number of all possible cases—as a theorem
in certain cases they call “N -urns.”
However, the list of assumptions they use is fairly long: 11 altogether. We
obtain similar results with fewer and simpler requirements, given in Sections
4–7. Here is a comparison:
• Clayton and Waddington use a variant of C2 that replaces “A is logically
equivalent to A′” with “A ∧X is logically equivalent to A′ ∧X”; this and
their Assumption 2.1 are comparable to our R1 (replacement of premise
or query with a logically equivalent formula).
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• Our R4 (preservation of the implication ordering) is a stronger (more gen-
eral) version of their Assumption 2.7. We do not actually need this more
general form—Lemma 13 only uses a restricted form that corresponds to
their Assumption 2.7—but we feel that the rationale for the requirement
is more clearly seen in this more general form.
• Our R2 (invariance under definition of new propositional symbols) and R3
(invariance under addition of irrelevant information) have no direct equiv-
alent among their assumptions, but are inspired by their discussion of the
Principle of Indifference and their Assumption 2.3 (translation invariance).
• We use no equivalent of C1 nor their Assumptions 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 3.2, 3.3,
and 3.5.
From the above comparison one can see that it is the replacement of Assumption
2.3 with R2 and R3 that allows a drastic pruning of the assumptions used in
obtaining the main results of their paper.
Our approach was inspired by Clayton and Waddington’s notion of an “N -
urn” and the results they prove for N -urns. Our most important innovation is
Lemma 6 showing how to reduce every allowable query-premise pair to a certain
kind of N -urn.
2.3. Carnap: logical probability
Carnap [5] undertakes an extensive investigation of “logical probability.” He
mentions two notions of probability: probability1 is epistemic probability1 (“the
degree of confirmation of a hypothesis h with respect to an evidence statement
e”), and probability2 is relative frequency. His focus is on probability1 and the
problem of induction. Our terminology and his correspond roughly as follows:
• Instead of a “plausibility function” Carnap discusses a “confirmation func-
tion” c.
• The rough equivalent of A | X in Carnap’s system is c(A,X), with a
crucial difference described below.
• We call A and X the query and premise, respectively; he calls them the
hypothesis and evidence.
We take A and X to be propositional formulas, whereas Carnap allows them to
be sentences in a variant of first-order predicate logic in which the only allowed
terms are variables and constant symbols. The domain of discourse is taken
to be a countably infinite set of individuals, and for each individual there is a
corresponding constant symbol. He calls this most general form of the language
L∞.
1Carnap later favored a decision-theoretic view of probability1 [5, Preface to the Second
Edition].
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Carnap also considers restricted languages LN , N ≥ 1, in which only the first
N constant symbols are allowed and the domain of discourse is only the first N
individuals. Most of the focus is on the finite languages LN , with confirmation
functions for L∞ defined via a limiting process on the sequence of languages
LN , N ≥ 1. This is similar in spirit, though not in detail, to our approach to
infinite domains.
A difference between Carnap’s approach and ours is that we posit a single
language and single set of propositional symbols S to be used for all prob-
lem domains, whereas in Carnap’s system each problem domain has its own
language L∞ with its own set of predicate symbols and associated arities and
interpretations.
Carnap’s finite languages LN are equivalent to propositional languages with
a finite number of propositional symbols. Let an atomic sentence be a formula of
the form p (s1, . . . , sk) for some k-ary predicate symbol p and constant symbols
s1, . . . , sk. There are a finite number of distinct atomic sentences in LN . Define
the propositional language L′N to have as propositional symbols the atomic
sentences of LN . We can transform any sentence A ∈ LN into an equivalent
propositional formula A′ ∈ L′N :
1. Remove all quantifiers by repeatedly replacing any occurrence of a subfor-
mula ∀xϕ(x) with the semantically equivalent finite conjunction ϕ (s1) ∧
· · · ∧ ϕ (sN ), where s1, . . . , sN are the constant symbols for the first N
individuals.
2. If equality is allowed, replace any subformula si = si with a logically
valid sentence, and any subformula si = sj , i 6= j, with an unsatisfiable
sentence. In both cases choose replacement sentences that contain no
quantifiers nor use of equality. (Carnap specifies that distinct constant
symbols are assumed to reference distinct individuals.)
We end up with propositional formulas in which the propositional symbols have
internal structure, but this internal structure is of no consequence from the
standpoint of deductive logic. To have logical effect, any intended meaning
for this internal structure must be given by additional formulas in L′N , axioms
that are added to the set of premises used. For example, suppose that we are
deducing the logical consequences of a set of premises Γ, that we have a two-
place predicate lt, and that the intended meaning of lt(x, y) is that individual
x precedes individuals y in some total ordering. Then we must add to Γ a set
of axioms such as the following:
∀x¬lt(x, x)
∀x∀y (lt(x, y) ∨ lt(y, x) ∨ x = y)
∀x∀y ∀z (lt(x, y) ∧ lt(y, z)→ lt(x, z))
More precisely, we must add to Γ the result of transforming the above sentences
of LN into equivalent propositional formulas of L′N .
Carnap, however, is unwilling to axiomatize the intended interpretations of
the predicate symbols in this way. He writes [5, p. 55],
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Since we intend to construct inductive logic as a theory of degree of
confirmation, based upon the meanings of the sentences involved—in
contradistinction to a mere calculus—we shall construct the lan-
guage systems L with an interpretation, hence as a system of se-
mantical rules, not as uninterpreted syntactical systems.
(Emphasis added.) This is an important difference between Carnap’s system
and ours, one that we discuss further in Section 3.4 and Section 9.2. Thus the
equivalent of Carnap’s c(h, e) in our scheme is not h | e, but instead h | e ∧X,
where X is a conjunction of
• propositional axioms expressing the logical structure of the problem do-
main, and
• propositional formulas expressing any other background information.
Unlike Cox [9], Carnap makes no attempt to derive the laws of probability from
more fundamental considerations; instead, his “conventions on adequacy” [5, p.
285] require that a valid confirmation function should conform to the laws of
probability. He ensures this by proceeding as follows:
1. A state description for LN amounts to a truth assignment on the set of
atomic sentences of LN .
2. A regular measure function for LN amounts to a strictly positive proba-
bility mass function over the set of state descriptions for LN .
3. A regular confirmation function c for LN is then a confirmation function
defined as
c(h, e) = m(h ∧ e)/m(e)
for some regular measure function m on LN .
4. These notions are extended to L∞ by imposing a consistency condition on
a sequence of regular measure functions mN on LN , N ≥ 1, considering
the associated regular confirmation functions cN , and defining c∞(h, e) =
limN→∞ cN (h, e).
We see therefore that, although it is the conditional probabilities c(h, e) that
most interest Carnap, unconditional probabilities are for him more fundamental.
In contrast, we take conditional plausibilities as the fundamental concept and,
rather than imposing the laws of probability, seek to derive them.
Carnap’s goal is that the confirmation function appropriate to a problem
domain should be uniquely determined by the semantics of the language L∞,
specifically, the intended interpretation of the predicate symbols and constant
symbols. In this he fails. Limiting his attention to systems that contain monadic
predicates (“properties”) only, he proposes a specific confirmation function c∗,
but says [5, p. 563],
Now the chief arguments in favor of the function c∗. . . will con-
sist in showing that this function is free of the inadequacies in the
other methods. It may then still be inadequate in other respects. It
will not be claimed that c∗ is a perfectly adequate explicatum for
probability1, let alone that it is the only adequate one. . .
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He later [5, Preface to Second Edition][6] proposes instead an entire family of
confirmation functions cλ parameterized by a positive number λ.
In contrast, we show in Theorem 14 that there is (up to isomorphism) a sin-
gle, unique plausibility function satisfying our criteria. Ironically, it corresponds
to the one confirmation function explicitly rejected by Carnap: a uniform dis-
tribution over the set of truth assignments satisfying the premise / evidence.
We discuss this further in Section 9.2.
3. Logical Preliminaries
In this section we review some concepts from CPL, introduce some additional
logical concepts of our own, and discuss the nature of the plausibility function
as extending the logical consequence relation |=.
3.1. Review of classical propositional logic
A proposition is a statement or assertion that must be true or false; it is
atomic if it cannot be decomposed into simpler assertions.
A propositional symbol is one of a countably infinite set of symbols S that
are used to represent atomic propositions. We abbreviate this to just “symbol”
when the meaning is clear.
If S ⊆ S then a propositional formula on S is one of the following:
• a propositional symbol from S;
• a formula ¬A, meaning “not A”, for some propositional formula A on S;
or
• a formula A ∧ B, meaning “A and B,” where A and B are propositional
formulas on S.
The other common logical operators—A∨B (or), A→ B (implies), and A↔ B
(if and only if)—are defined in terms of ¬ and ∧ in the usual way. We abbreviate
“propositional formula” as just “formula” when the meaning is clear.
We write Φ (S) for the set of all propositional formulas on S, and Φ+(S) for
the satisfiable formulas.
We write σ JA1, . . . , AnK for the set of all propositional symbols occuring in
any of the propositional formulas A1, . . . , An.
A truth assignment on S is a function ρ : S → {0, 1}, with 0 and 1 standing
for falsity and truth, respectively. We recursively extend it to all formulas on S
in the obvious way:
ρ JAK = ρ(A) if A ∈ S
ρ J¬AK = 1− ρ JAK
ρ JA ∧BK = ρ JAK · ρ JBK
where ‘·’ is just integer multiplication.
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A truth assignment ρ on S satisfies a formula A on S if ρ JAK = 1. A formula
A is satisfiable if there is some truth assignment ρ on σ JAK that satisfies A. A
formula A is logically valid, written |= A, if every truth assignment on σ JAK
satisfies A.
We say that B is a logical consequence of A, or A logically implies B, written
A |= B, if every truth assignment on σ JA,BK that satisfies A also satisfies B.
This captures the notion of a logically valid argument: conclusion B follows as
a logical consequence of premises A1, . . . , An if A1 ∧ · · · ∧ An |= B. Note that
A |= B if and only if |= A→ B.
The restriction of a truth assignment ρ on S to some S′ ⊆ S is the truth
assignment ρ′ on S′ such that ρ′(s) = ρ(s) for every s ∈ S′.
Note that ρ JAK depends only on the truth values assigned to those symbols
that actually appear in A; if A is a formula on S′ ⊆ S, ρ is a truth assignment
on S, and ρ′ is the restriction of ρ to S′, then ρ′ JAK = ρ JAK. Because of
this, we have some leeway in choosing the set of propositional symbols to use
in the definitions of “logically valid,” “satisfiable,” and “logical consequence.” If
σ JAK ⊆ SA and σ JA,BK ⊆ SAB , then
• A is logically valid iff every truth assignment on SA satisfies A.
• A is satisfiable iff some truth assignment on SA satisfies A.
• A |= B iff every truth assignment on SAB that satisfies A also satisfies B.
Some notation.
• Two formulas are logically equivalent, written A ≡ B, if |= A↔ B.
• A and B are logically equivalent assuming X, written A ≡X B, if X |=
A↔ B.
• We will use finite quantification as an abbreviation where convenient, for
example writing
∧n
i=1Ai for A1 ∧ · · · ∧An.
• If we write A1 ∧ · · · ∧ An and n = 0, we understand this to mean some
logically valid formula such as s ∨ ¬s.
• If we write A1 ∨ · · · ∨ An and n = 0, we understand this to mean some
unsatisfiable formula such as s ∧ ¬s.
3.2. Finite sample spaces
The development of probability theory usually begins with the idea of a
sample space, which has been downplayed so far—the focus has been on propo-
sitions. We find in Theorem 14 that A | X can be characterized in terms of
an induced sample space: the set of truth assignments that satisfy X.2 In par-
ticular, we find that A | X is a function of the proportion of points from this
induced sample space that satisfy A. This motivates the following:
2This is similar to Carnap’s system, in which the set of state descriptions serve as a sample
space.
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Definition 1. #S(X) is the number of truth assignments on S satisfying X,
for any formula X and finite S such that σ JXK ⊆ S ⊆ S.
The size of the induced sample space is #S(X), and the proportion of points
from the induced sample space that satisfy A is #S (A ∧X) /#S(X), for S ⊇
σJA,XK.
Typically one thinks of a finite sample space as an arbitrary set of n > 0
distinct values Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωn} representing different possible states of some
system under consideration. We can relate this to our notion of an induced
sample space by choosing a set of n propositional symbols S = {s1, . . . , sn},
with the intended interpretation of si being that the state of the system is ωi.
If our premise X is a formula expressing that exactly one of the si is true, then
there is a one-to-one correspondence between our original sample space Ω and
the induced sample space of truth assignments, with ωi corresponding to the
single truth assignment ρ on S satisfying si ∧X. This motivates the following:
Definition 2. Given any sequence of n > 0 propositional symbols s1, . . . , sn,
〈s1, . . . , sn〉 = (s1 ∨ · · · ∨ sn) ∧
∧
1≤i<j≤n
¬ (si ∧ sj) ;
that is, 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 means that exactly one of the si is true.
3.3. The implication ordering
At first blush it would seem that CPL tells us very little about the relative
plausibilities of different propositions, beyond determining which are certainly
true and which are certainly false given a premise X. The reality is quite the
opposite: CPL comes equipped with a rich inherent plausibility ordering that
we call the implication ordering.
Definition 3. Let A,B,X ∈ Φ (S) with X satisfiable. We define
(A XB) ⇔ (X |= A→ B)
(A ≺XB) ⇔ (A XB) and not (B XA) .
The following properties are easily verified:
• The relation X is a preorder: it is reflexive and transitive, but not anti-
symmetric.
• A ≺XB is the same as (A XB and not A ≡XB).
• A ≡XB if and only A XB and B XA.
• If A ≡XA′ and B ≡XB′ and A XB then A′ XB′.
Hence X defines a partial order on the equivalence classes of propositional
formulas under the relation ≡X. This partial order is essentially just the subset
ordering on truth assignments:
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Property. Let A1, A2, X ∈ Φ (S) with X satisfiable. Then A1 X A2 if and
only if α JA1K ⊆ α JA2K, where α JAK is the set of truth assignments on S that
satisfy both A and X.
Assuming X, we therefore conclude the following:
• If A X B then B is at least as plausible as A, since B is true for any
possible world (truth assignment satisfying X) for which A is true.
• If A ≡X B then A XB and B XA, hence A and B are equally plausible.
• If A ≺XB then B is strictly more plausible than A, since there are possible
worlds for which B is true and A is not, but not vice versa.
Consider an example that uses three propositional symbols s1, s2, s3 with X
defined to be the formula stating that exactly one of these three is true: X =
〈s1, s2, s3〉. Let F be any unsatisfiable formula and T be any logically valid
formula. Then
F ≺X s1 ≺X (s1 ∨ s2) ≺X (s1 ∨ s2 ∨ s3) ≡X T.
Note that adding additional information to the premise yields additional formu-
las A → B as logical consequences, and hence may collapse previously distinct
plausibilities. Continuing the example, if we add additional information to X
to obtain Y = X ∧ ¬s2, then
F ≺Y s1 ≡Y (s1 ∨ s2) ≺Y (s1 ∨ s2 ∨ s3) ≡Y T.
3.4. The plausibility function
We extend CPL to Jaynes’s “logic of plausible reasoning” by introducing a
plausibility function (· | ·) whose domain is Φ (S) × Φ+ (S). Think of (· | ·) as
extending the logical consequence relation: whereas X |= A means that A is
known true (given X), and X |= ¬A means that A is known false, it may be that
neither of these relations hold; (· | ·) fills in the gaps, so to speak, by assigning
intermediate plausibilities in such a case.
The logical consequence relation, as we have defined it, takes only a single
premise X on the left-hand side, rather than a set of premises X . The com-
pactness theorem for CPL says that if A is a logical consequence of a set of
premises X , then it is a logical consequence of a finite subset of X [14, p. 16];
but any finite set of premises X1, . . . , Xn can be combined into a single premise
X = X1 ∧ · · · ∧Xn. Likewise, the plausibility function (· | ·) takes only a single
premise as its second argument.
We write P for the range of the plausibility function, but leave it otherwise
unspecified:
Definition 4. P is the set of achievable and meaningful plausibility values; that
is,
P = {(A | X) : A,X ∈ Φ (S) and X is satisfiable} .
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There has been much unnecessary controversy over Cox’s Theorem due
to differing implicit assumptions as to the nature of its plausibility function.
Halpern [11, 12] claims to demonstrate a counterexample to Cox’s Theorem
by examining a finite problem domain, but his argument presumes that there
is a different plausibility function for every problem domain. Others [9, 16]
seem to presume a single plausibility function, but with domain-specific infor-
mation serving as an implicit extra argument3. A third interpretation [7, 13, 21]
presumes a single plausibility function with all relevant information about the
problem domain encapsulated in the second argument, the “state of informa-
tion.”
We follow this third interpretation, with the premise—a propositional for-
mula—serving as the state of information:
• In CPL there is only a single logical consequence relation |=, defined on
Φ (S), rather than entirely different logical consequence relations for each
problem domain. In our extended logic there is likewise only a single plau-
sibility function, defined on Φ (S)×Φ+ (S), and a single set of plausibility
values P that are used for all problem domains.
• In CPL any information about the problem domain that we wish to use for
deduction must be included in the premise(s) to the logical consequence
relation. Likewise in our extended logic, all relevant background informa-
tion about the problem domain must be included in the premise to the
plausibility function.
Think of the plausibility function as something one could implement as a pure
function in some programming language, taking as input two strings matching
the grammar for propositional formulas (or their corresponding parse trees),
and having access to no other source of information about the problem domain.
Note that we use the same set of propositional symbols S for all problem
domains, rather than having a different set of propositional symbols for each
problem domain. The latter option would make the set of allowed propositional
symbols an implicit extra argument to the plausibility function. The set of
symbols S is countably infinite to allow modeling arbitrarily complex problem
domains.
As an example of incorporating background information into the premise,
suppose that we wish to discuss the outcome of rolling a six-sided die, and
our background knowledge is simply the list of distinct possible outcomes. Let
symbols si, 1 ≤ i ≤ 6, have the intended interpretation that the outcome is i.
The formula 〈s1, . . . , s6〉 expresses our background knowledge, and so
s2 | 〈s1, . . . , s6〉
3Strictly speaking, this also amounts to a different plausibility function for every problem
domain, but the practical difference is that certain structural properties of the plausibility
function, such as its range and the choice of the functions F and S, remain the same across
problem domains.
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is the plausibility of rolling a 2, and
s1 ∨ s2 | (s1 ∨ s3 ∨ s5) ∧ 〈s1, . . . , s6〉
is the plausibility of rolling a 1 or 2 given that the outcome is odd.
This stands in stark contrast to Carnap, who as previously mentioned rejects
such an axiomatic approach. The second argument to his confirmation function
is the evidence, which is “an observational report” that “refer[s] to facts” [5, pp.
19–20]; background knowledge about the meaning of the symbols and logical
structure of the domain is excluded. Given a situation like our die roll, in which
there is a “family of related properties,” exactly one of which holds true for
each individual, Carnap goes so far as to require modifying the definition of a
fundamental concept in his system, the state-description, rather than simply
including this information in the evidence [5, p. 77].
4. Invariance from Logical Equivalence
In this and the following sections we introduce our Requirements on the
plausibility function and prove their consequences. These are all based on pre-
serving existing properties of CPL. We shall consider properties of the logi-
cal consequence relation |=, as well as the implication ordering X for a given
premise X.
The first property we consider is invariance under replacement of premise or
query by a logically equivalent formula.
The logical consequence relation |= is invariant to replacement of premise by
a logically equivalent formula: if X ≡ Y then for all formulas A we have X |= A
if and only if Y |= A. We require that the plausibility function exhibit this
same invariance. This may be further justified by noting that the implication
orderings X and Y are identical when X ≡ Y .
The relation |= is also invariant to replacement of conclusion by a logically
equivalent formula. In fact, the replacement formula need only be logically
equivalent assuming the premise: if A ≡XB, then X |= A if and only if X |= B.
We require that the plausibility function exhibit this invariance also, for the
query. This may be further justified by our argument in Section 3.3 that we
should consider A and B equally plausible, assuming X, whenever A ≡XB.
We combine these into a single requirement:
R1. If X ≡ Y and A ≡X B then A | X = B | Y .
5. Invariance under Definition of New Symbols
It is common in mathematical proofs to define new symbols as abbreviations
for complex expressions or formulas. The same may be done in propositional
logic: we may introduce a new propositional symbol s (that appears in neither
the premises nor conclusion) and use it as an abbreviation for some complex
propositional formula E, by adding the definition s↔ E to our premises. This
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does not invalidate any logical consequence we already had, nor any create any
new logical consequence that does not mention s.
Specifically, let s be a symbol not occurring in X, E, or A, and define
Y = (s↔ E) ∧X . Then X |= A if and only if Y |= A, and consequently, X
and Y are identical on Φ (S \ {s}). We require that the plausibility function
exhibit the same invariance:
R2. Let s ∈ S but s /∈ σ JA,X,EK. Then A | X = A | (s↔ E) ∧X.
One cannot evade the force of this Requirement by supposing a problem
domain with a limited set of symbols. Recall that there is only one plausibility
function, used for all problem domains, and that S is countably infinite. Fur-
thermore, even if the plausibility function were to take as a third argument a
finite set of symbols from which the query and premise are constructed, the
notion of extending a domain by defining an additional variable as a function of
existing variables would still make sense. Forbidding such extension would be
an artificial and unreasonable restriction, as one can already do this in CPL.
5.1. Invariance under renaming
To build some intuition for R2 we now explore some of its more straightfor-
ward consequences, in conjunction with R1 (logical equivalence).
Let us write B [s/C] for the result of replacing every occurrence of symbol
s in formula B with the formula C. If s and t are distinct symbols, with t not
occurring in formulas A or X, then using R2 to introduce a definition and later
remove a different one gives us
A | X = A | (t↔ s) ∧X
= A[s/t] | (t↔ s) ∧X[s/t]
= A[s/t] | (s↔ t) ∧X[s/t]
= A[s/t] | X[s/t].
That is, we can rename any single symbol, replacing it throughout A and X
with a new symbol, and this leaves the plausibility unchanged.
Repeating the process, the plausibility is invariant if we rename any set of
symbols S = {s1, . . . , sn} to new symbols T = {t1, . . . , tn} not occurring in A
or X. We can also permute the symbol names, by renaming from s1, . . . , sn to
t1, . . . , tn and then to a permuation s′1, . . . , s′n of s1, . . . , sn. That is, if we write
B [s1/C1, . . . , sn/Cn] for the formula obtained by simultaneously replacing each
symbol si with the formula Ci, we have
A | X = A [s1/s′1, . . . , sn/s′n] | X [s1/s′1, . . . , sn/s′n] .
This result is the same as Clayton & Waddington’s Assumption 2.3 (translation
invariance) [7], which they motivate via Jaynes’s “indifference” criterion [13, p.
19]:
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The robot always represents equivalent states of knowledge by equiv-
alent plausibility assignments. That is, if in two problems the robot’s
state of knowledge is the same (except perhaps for the labeling of
the propositions), then it must assign the same plausibilities in both.
For example, if a, b, c, d are distinct symbols, then the following equalities hold:
a | a ∨ b = c | c ∨ d
a | a→ b = b | b→ a
Consider specifically the case where X treats symbols s and t symmetrically:
that is, X is logically equivalent to X ′ = X[s/t, t/s]. One example would be
X = (s ∨ t) ∧ ¬ (s ∧ t)
X ′ = (t ∨ s) ∧ ¬ (t ∧ s) .
In this case we find that s and t must be equally plausible:
s | X = t | X ′ = t | X.
This result is similar in spirit to the principle of insufficient reason: our premise
X provides no information that differs between s and t, so intuition suggests
these propositions should be equally plausible. The result is more general, how-
ever, in that s and t need not be mutually exclusive nor exhaustive.
Another transformation we can consider is that of replacing all occurrences
of symbol s with ¬s in both premise and query. As before, let s and t be
distinct symbols, with t not occurring in formulas A nor X. Again we use R2 to
introduce a definition and later remove a different one; we also add a final step
that invokes the above-demonstrated invariance under renaming. This yields
the following:
A | X = A | (t↔ ¬s) ∧X
= A[s/¬¬s] | (t↔ ¬s) ∧X[s/¬¬s]
= A[s/¬t] | (t↔ ¬s) ∧X[s/¬t]
= A[s/¬t] | (s↔ ¬t) ∧X[s/¬t]
= A[s/¬t] | X[s/¬t]
= A[s/¬t][t/s] | X[s/¬t][t/s]
= A[s/¬s] | X[s/¬s].
That is, the plausibility is invariant to a transformation in which we uniformly
replace any single symbol with its negation throughout both A and X. In
particular, if X is logically equivalent to X[s/¬s], then
s | X = ¬s | X.
This result may be viewed as an instance of the principle of insufficient reason
applied to the case of two indistinguishable possibilities.
Take note of the common pattern in the above two derivations:
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1. Use R2 to introduce a definition of some symbol t in terms of symbol s
appearing in the premise or query.
2. Use logical equivalence and the definition of t to rewrite premise and query
in a way that removes all occurrences of s except its occurrence in the
right-hand side of the definition of t.
3. Use logical equivalence to rewrite the definition of t in terms of s as a
definition of s in terms of t.
4. Use R2 to drop the definition of s, as this symbol is now used nowhere
else in the premise or query.
Lemma 6 in Section 5.3 extends this pattern to sets of symbols, simultaneously
introducing multiple definitions in step 1, and this yields a stronger form of
transformation invariance that subsumes the results derived here.
5.2. Invariance under change of variables
Renaming symbols and swapping s for ¬s throughout both premise and
query are special cases of more general change of variables transformations. As
an example of this, suppose that we are considering a problem domain in which
there is some quantity x that can take on any of n discrete, ordered values
v1 < v2 < · · · < vn. There are two different vocabularies we might use for this
domain:
1. Use symbols s1, . . . , sn with the intended meaning of si being “x = vi,”
and express “x ≤ vi” as s1 ∨ · · · ∨ si.
2. Use symbols t1, . . . , tn with the intended meaning of ti being “x ≤ vi,”
and express “x = vi” as ti ∧ ¬ti−1 when i > 1, or just ti when i = 1.
The two vocabularies can express exactly the same propositions, so there is
no fundamental reason to choose one over the other, and it seems that the
plausibility A | X should not depend on which vocabulary we use. Going from
one vocabulary to the other is just a change of variables: we can express each
of the si in terms of t1, . . . , tn, or we can express each of the ti in terms of
s1, . . . , sn.
This isn’t quite enough, though. Defining
τst(A) = A [s1 / t1, s2 / t2 ∧ ¬t1, . . . , sn / tn ∧ ¬tn−1]
τts(B) = B [t1 / s1, t2 / s1 ∨ s2, . . . , tn / s1 ∨ · · · ∨ sn]
we want τst and τts to be inverses of each other (up to logical equivalence). We
find that τts (τst (A)) is logically equivalent to A, but
τst (τts (B)) ≡ B [t1 / t1, t2 / t1 ∨ t2, . . . , tn / t1 ∨ · · · ∨ tn]
which is not, in general, logically equivalent to B. We need to assume that
ti → ti+1 for 1 ≤ i < n to get the desired equivalence. Such an assumption
concords with the intended meaning of ti, and must be implied by the premise
when vocabulary 2 is used. (Likewise, the premise must imply 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 when
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vocabulary 1 is used.) So this notion of change of variables is more subtle than
it appears at first glance; how do we define a general rule that accounts for
issues like this?
The solution is to define a change of variables in terms of a bijection between
• the set of truth assignments satisfying the premise when vocabulary 1 is
used, and
• the set of truth assignments satisfying the premise when vocabulary 2 is
used.
This motivates the following:
Definition 5. f is a change-of-variables transformation between the pairs
(A,X) and (A′, X ′) if it is a bijection between
• the set of truth assignments on some S ⊇ σ JA,XK satisfying X, and
• the set of truth assignments on some S′ ⊇ σ JA′, X ′K satisfying X ′,
with the additional property that any truth assignment ρ on S satisfies A ∧X
if and only if f(ρ) satisfies A′ ∧X ′.
Note that the logical consequence relation trivially satisfies invariance under
change of variables:
X |= A⇔ X ′ |= A′ if there exists a change-of-variables transforma-
tion f between (A,X) and (A′, X ′).
For the plausibility function, invariance under change of variables means the
following:
A | X = A′ | X ′ if there exists a change-of-variables transformation
f between (A,X) and (A′, X ′).
Invariance under definition of new symbols is a special case of invariance under
change of variables: we have A′ = A, X ′ = (s↔ E) ∧ X, S = σ JA,X,EK,
S′ = S ∪ {s}, and f(ρ) = ρ′ where
ρ′(s) = ρ JEK
ρ′(t) = ρ(t) if t ∈ S.
The inverse of f maps ρ′ to the restriction of ρ′ to S.
We show in Corollary 9 that R1 and R2 together imply invariance under
change of variables. So, given R1, invariance under change of variables and
invariance under definition of new symbols are equivalent. We chose the latter
as our requirement because it is easier to explain and justify.
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5.3. Reduction to canonical form
We take the first step towards our main result by showing that we can reduce
every query-premise pair to a canonical form in which the premise merely states
that we have a sample space of n distinct possibilities, and the query merely
states that one of the first m ≤ n possibilities is true. In the following, keep in
mind our convention that A1 ∨ · · · ∨ Am stands for some unsatisfiable formula
when m = 0.
Lemma 6. Let S ⊆ S be finite, A ∈ Φ (S), and X ∈ Φ+(S). Then R1 and R2
together imply that
A | X = (t1 ∨ · · · ∨ tm | 〈t1, . . . , tn〉)
where n = #S(X) > 0, m = #S (A ∧X) ≤ n, and T = {t1, . . . , tn} is any set
of n propositional symbols disjoint from S.
Proof. Let ρ1, . . . , ρn be the truth assignments on S that satisfy X, ordered so
that the first m also satisfy A. Enumerate the elements of S as s1, . . . , sp. The
proof proceeds in four steps.
Step 1. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ p define
Zi = Li,1 ∧ · · · ∧ Li,p
Li,j =
{
sj if ρi (sj) = 1
¬sj if ρi (sj) = 0.
Note that ρi is the one and only truth assignment on S that satisfies Zi.
Define the formulas
Dt,i = ti ↔ Zi
Dt = Dt,1 ∧ · · · ∧Dt,n.
Then by R2,
A | X = A | Dt ∧X. (5.1)
Step 2. The formulas Zi were constructed such that
A ∧X ≡ Z1 ∨ · · · ∨ Zm
and hence
Dt ∧X |= (A↔ Z1 ∨ · · · ∨ Zm) .
R1 then gives
A | Dt ∧X = (t1 ∨ · · · ∨ tm | Dt ∧X) . (5.2)
Step 3. Define the following:
Ij = {i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ρi (sj) = 1}
Ds,j = sj ↔
∨
i∈Ij
ti
Ds = Ds,1 ∧ · · · ∧Ds,p.
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Consider how to construct the set of truth assignments ρ˜ on S ∪ T that satisfy
both 〈t1, . . . , tn〉 and Ds:
1. Choose any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
2. Set ρ˜ (ti) = 1 and ρ˜ (th) = 0 for h 6= i.
3. For j ∈ {1, . . . , p}, set ρ˜ (sj) to the unique value required to satisfy Ds,j ;
this value is 1 iff i ∈ Ij , and i ∈ Ij iff ρi (sj) = 1, so the required value is
just ρi (sj).
1 and 2 construct all the ways of ensuring that 〈t1, . . . , tn〉 is satisfied, and 3
then is the only way to finish defining ρ˜ that satisfies Ds.
Similarly, consider how to construct the set of truth assignments ρ˜ on S ∪ T
that satisfy both X and Dt:
1. Choose any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Recall that ρi is one of the truth assignments
satisfying X.
2. For j ∈ {1, . . . , p}, set ρ˜ (sj) = ρi (sj).
3. For h ∈ {1, . . . , n}, set ρ˜ (th) to the unique value required to satisfy Dt,h.
This is just ρi JZhK, which is 1 for h = i and 0 for h 6= i.
1 and 2 construct all the ways of ensuring that X is satisfied, and 3 then is the
only way to finish defining ρ˜ that satisfies Dt.
But these two sets of truth assignments are the same set! Therefore
Ds ∧ 〈t1, . . . , tn〉 ≡ Dt ∧X
and so, by R1,
(t1 ∨ · · · ∨ tm | Dt ∧X) = (t1 ∨ · · · ∨ tm | Ds ∧ 〈t1, . . . , tn〉) . (5.3)
Step 4. Using R2 we have
(t1 ∨ · · · ∨ tm | Ds ∧ 〈t1, . . . , tn〉) = (t1 ∨ · · · ∨ tm | 〈t1, . . . , tn〉) (5.4)
since the symbols s1, . . . , sp appear only on the left-hand-sides of the definitions
in Ds.
Combining (5.1)–(5.4) yields the theorem.
5.4. Additional consequences
In light of Lemma 6 we define the following:
Definition 7. For any n > 0 and 0 ≤ m ≤ n,
Υ2 (m,n) = (s1 ∨ · · · ∨ sm | 〈s1, . . . , sn〉) ,
where s1, . . . , sn ∈ S are n distinct propositional symbols.
We may then restate Lemma 6 as follows:
Corollary 8. Let A ∈ Φ (S) and X ∈ Φ+ (S) for some finite S ⊆ S. Then R1
and R2 together imply that
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A | X = Υ2 (#S (A ∧X) ,#S (X)) .
Proof. Let m = #S (A ∧X) and n = #S (X) > 0. Choose any n symbols
t1, . . . , tn ∈ S disjoint from both σ JA,XK and the set of symbols {s1, . . . , sn}
in the definition of Υ2. Then two applications of Lemma 6 yields
A | X = (t1 ∨ · · · ∨ tm | 〈t1, . . . , tn〉)
= (s1 ∨ · · · ∨ sm | 〈s1, . . . , sn〉)
= Υ2(m,n).
We also obtain invariance under change of variables as an immediate conse-
quence:
Corollary 9. Let f be a change-of-variables transformation between (A,X) and
(A′, X ′). Then R1 and R2 together imply that
A′ | X ′ = A | X.
Proof. Let f map from truth assignments on S ⊇ σ JA,XK to truth assignments
on S′ ⊇ σ JA′, X ′K. Then #S (X) = #S′ (X ′) and #S (A ∧X) = #S′ (A′ ∧X ′);
the result then follows from Corollary 8.
6. Invariance under Addition of Irrelevant Information
Suppose we are interested in a problem domain whose concepts are repre-
sented by the propositional symbols in some set S. A formula Y containing
no symbol from S tells us nothing about this domain; it is irrelevant informa-
tion. Adding Y to the premise does not allow us to draw any new conclusions
involving only symbols in S.
Specifically, let Y be a satisfiable formula having no symbols in common
with X or A, and define Z = Y ∧X. Then X |= A if and only if Z |= A, and
consequently the implication orderings X and Z are identical on Φ (S \ σ JY K).
We require the plausibility function to be invariant in the same way:
R3. Let Y be a satisfiable formula with σ JX,AK ∩ σ JY K = ∅. Then A | X =
A | Y ∧X.
Again, one cannot evade the force of this Requirement by supposing a prob-
lem domain with a limited set of symbols, as discussed for R2. Furthermore,
even if we were to associate a finite set of allowable symbols with each different
problem domain, the notion of combining two unrelated problem domains into
one would still make sense. Forbidding such a combining operation would be
an artificial and unreasonable restriction, as one can already do this in CPL.
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6.1. Independence
The Requirements so far do not force A | X to be any sort of conditional
probability; but if A | X is the conditional probability of A given X for some
probability distribution, R3 implies that we don’t come pre-supplied with de-
pendencies between the atomic propositions. Any such dependencies have to be
created by information in X. This is in line with our intention that the plau-
sibility function be universal, one single function used in all problem domains,
computed using no source of information other than the query and premise
themselves, with any information needed to distinguish different problem do-
mains required to be included in the premise.
Carnap’s proposed confirmation function c∗ in particular violates R3, as it
imposes a probabilistic dependency between any two atomic sentences having
the same predicate and the same number of distinct arguments. In particular,
it is a violation of R3 that, for distinct individual constants a1, . . . , ak+1 and
monadic predicate pi, we have
c∗ (pi (ak+1)) =
1
2
but
c∗ (pi (ak+1) | pi (a1) ∧ · · · ∧ pi (ak)) ≈ 1 for large k.
Carnap finds it necessary to introduce this dependency between atomic sen-
tences to allow induction, but as we will show in Section 9.2, the problem arises
only because he omits background information from the premise / evidence.
Once the necessary background information is included in the premise there is
no longer a violation of R3.
6.2. Scale invariance of Υ2
Suppose that S = σ JA,XK and T is obtained from S by adding r symbols
not found in S. Then #T (X) = 2r ·#S(X) and #T (A ∧X) = 2r ·#S (A ∧X),
from which we conclude that Υ2 (2rm, 2rn) = Υ2(m,n). Adding R3 allows us to
extend this scale invariance to multipliers k that are not powers of 2, and hence
to show that A | X is a function only of the ratio of #S (A ∧X) to #S(X).
Lemma 10. Suppose that R1, R2, and R3 hold. Then for every n, k > 0 and
0 ≤ m ≤ n,
Υ2 (km, kn) = Υ2 (m,n) .
Proof. Let S1 = {s11, . . . , s1n} and S2 = {s21, . . . , s2k} be two disjoint sets of
propositional symbols. There are kn truth assignments on S1 ∪ S2 satisfying
both 〈s21, . . . , s2k〉 and 〈s11, . . . , s1n〉, and km of these truth assignments also
satisfy s11 ∨ · · · ∨ s1m. Then
Υ2 (m,n) = (s11 ∨ · · · ∨ s1m | 〈s11, . . . , s1n〉)
= (s11 ∨ · · · ∨ s1m | 〈s21, . . . , s2k〉 ∧ 〈s11, . . . , s1n〉)
= Υ2 (km, kn) .
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The first and third equalities follows from Corollary 8. The second equality
follows from R3, invariance under addition of irrelevant information.
Definition 11. For any n > 0 and 0 ≤ m ≤ n,
Υ1
(m
n
)
= Υ2 (m,n) .
Lemma 10 ensures that Υ1 (r) is uniquely defined for any rational r in the
unit interval when the appropriate Requirements hold. We then obtain the
following:
Corollary 12. Let S ⊆ S be finite, A ∈ Φ (S), and X ∈ Φ+(S). Then R1, R2,
and R3 together imply that
A | X = Υ1
(
#S (A ∧X)
#S (X)
)
.
Proof. Let m = #S (A ∧X) and n = #S (X). From Corollary 8 and Lemma
10 we get
A | X = Υ2 (m,n) = Υ1 (m/n) .
7. Preservation of Existing Distinctions in Degree of Plausibility
Our final requirement is that the plausibility function be consistent with the
implication ordering for the premise. Strictly more plausible queries, according
to the implication ordering, must yield strictly greater plausibility values.
R4. There is a partial order ≤P on P such that, for any satisfiable formula X,
if A ≺XB then A | X <P B | X.
As usual, we understand p1 <P p2 to mean p1 ≤P p2 and p1 6= p2.
The previous Requirements all have the effect of collapsing together what
might otherwise be distinct plausibilities, but say nothing about when plausi-
bilities must remain distinct from each other. They do not even rule out the
possibility that all plausibilities collapse down to a single value. Adding R4
prevents any further collapse of plausibility values beyond that of Corollary 12,
as we prove with Lemma 13 below.
7.1. A too-simple plausibility function
Suppose that we choose the plausibility function to be a direct translation
of the logical consequence relation, defining
A | X =

F if X |= ¬A
T if X |= A
u otherwise
23
with P = {F, u,T} and F <P u <P T. It is straightforward to verify that this
definition satisfies R1, R2, and R3, by appealing to the corresponding properties
of the logical equivalence relation |=. However, this definition violates R4, since
R4 implies that P must be infinite.
To see this, suppose that P is finite. Choose n > |P| distinct symbols
s1, . . . , sn and define
X =
n−1∧
i=1
(si → si+1) .
Then
s1 ≺X s2 ≺X · · · ≺X sn
and R4 therefore mandates that
s1 | X < s2 | X < · · · < sn | X;
but this cannot be, as P contains fewer than n elements.
7.2. Probability from plausibility
We proceed with the proof of our main result, starting with a lemma.
Lemma 13. If R1–R4 hold then for all r, r′ ∈ Q01 , Q ∩ [0, 1] we have
Υ1 (r) = Υ1 (r
′)⇔ r = r′
Υ1 (r) <P Υ (r
′)⇔ r < r′.
Proof. We may express r and r′ as ratios with a common denominator n > 0 as
r = m/n and r′ = m′/n. Using R4 and writing X for 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 we have
r < r′ ⇒ m < m′
⇒ (s1 ∨ · · · ∨ sm) ≺X (s1 ∨ · · · ∨ sm′)
⇒ Υ1(r) <P Υ1(r′). (7.1)
Furthermore, using antisymmetry of the partial order ≤P and (7.1),
r 6< r′ ⇒ (r = r′) ∨ (r′ < r)
⇒ Υ1 (r′) ≤P Υ1 (r)
⇒ Υ1 (r) 6<P Υ1 (r′) .
Trivially,
r = r′ ⇒ Υ1 (r) = Υ1 (r′) .
Furthermore, using (7.1) again,
r 6= r′ ⇒ (r < r′) ∨ (r′ < r)
⇒ Υ1 (r) 6= Υ1 (r′) .
24
And now we arrive at the central result of this paper.
Theorem 14. If R1–R4 hold then
1. Υ1 is an order isomorphism between the posets (Q01,≤) and (P,≤P);
2. for all finite S ⊆ S, A ∈ Φ(S), and X ∈ Φ+(S) we have
P (A | X) = #S (A ∧X)
#S(X)
.
where P = Υ−11 .
Proof. By Corollary 12, Υ1 : Q01 → P is onto, and by Lemma 13, Υ1 is a
strictly increasing function (hence also one-to-one). So Υ1 is an order-preserving
bijection between Q01 and P, that is, it is an order isomorphism.
Since Υ1 is a bijection, its inverse P exists. The second claim is then just a
restatement of Corollary 12.
The laws of probability follow directly from Theorem 14. In stating them it
is convenient to extend the plausibility function to unsatisfiable premises using
the convention that A | X = Υ1(1), and hence P (A | X) = 1, when X is
unsatisfiable. This may be justified by noting that for satisfiable X we have
P (A | X) = 1 whenever X |= A, and when X is unsatisfiable we have X |= A
for all formulas A.
Corollary 15. If R1–R4 hold and we define A | X = Υ1(1) for unsatisfiable
X, then
1. 0 ≤ P (A | X) ≤ 1.
2. P (A | X) = 1 if X |= A.
3. P (A | X) = 0 if X |= ¬A and X is satisfiable.
4. P (¬A | X) = 1− P (A | X) if X is satisfiable.
5. P (A ∧B | X) = P (B | X) · P (A | B ∧X).
Proof. (1)–(4) are trivial, but (5) merits comment because care must be taken
in handling unsatisfiable premises. There are three cases:
1. If X is unsatisfiable then so is B ∧X, and the claim reduces to 1 = 1 · 1.
2. If X is satisfiable but B ∧X is not then X logically implies both ¬B and
¬ (A ∧B), so P (B | X) = 0 and P (A ∧B | X) = 0 and P (A | B ∧X) =
1, and the claim reduces to 0 = 0 · 1.
3. If X and B ∧X are both satisfiable, let S = σ JA,B,XK, n = #S(X) > 0,
p = #S (B ∧X) > 0, and m = #S (A ∧B ∧X); then
P (A ∧B | X) = m
n
=
p
n
· m
p
= P (B | X) · P (A | B ∧X) .
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Theorem 14 and Corollary 15 tell us that plausibilities are essentially just
probabilities, following the classical definition of probability as the ratio of fa-
vorable cases to all cases. That is, our four Requirements, based entirely on
preserving existing properties of CPL, lead us to identify finite-set probabil-
ity theory as the uniquely determined extension of CPL to a logic of plausible
reasoning.
8. Consistency of Requirements
An issue that must be addressed for any axiomatic development is whether
its content is vacuous by virtue of there not existing any mathematical struc-
ture satisfying the given axioms. If our Requirements are inconsistent—if there
does not exist any plausibility function (· | ·) for which the Requirements all
hold—then Theorem 14 is trivially true, and our entire exercise is pointless. We
now show that this is not the case, by exhibiting a specific plausibility function
that satisfies all the Requirements.
Theorem 14 provides an obvious candidate for this plausibility function.
However, that theorem (and the results leading up to it) cannot help in proving
that the Requirements can be satisfied, as they are consequences of assuming
that one already has some plausibility function satisfying the Requirements.
Theorem 16. R1–R4 are consistent. In particular, suppose that for any for-
mula A and satisfiable formula X we define
A | X = #T (A ∧X)
#T (X)
,
where T = σ JA,XK; then R1–R4 all hold.
Proof. Consider any finite set of symbols S ⊇ T . If S contains k additional sym-
bols beyond those in T then #S(X) = 2k#T (X) and #S (A ∧X) = 2k#T (A ∧X),
hence
A | X = #S (A ∧X)
#S (X)
.
Thus we may use any superset of the symbols appearing in A and X when
evaluating A | X.
We now consider each of the Requirements in turn.
R1. LetX ≡ Y and A ≡XB and S = σ JA,B,X, Y K. Then #S(X) = #S(Y )
and #S (A ∧X) = #S (B ∧X) = #S (B ∧ Y ), hence A | X = B | Y .
R2. Let Y be (s↔ E) ∧ X, where s is a propositional symbol not in S =
σ JA,X,EK. Let S′ = S ∪{s}. Each truth assignment on S satisfying X can be
extended to a truth assignment on S′ satisfying Y in exactly one way, therefore
#S′(Y ) = #S(X). Likewise, #S′ (A ∧ Y ) = #S (A ∧X). Hence A | Y = A | X.
R3. Let S = σ JA,XK, S′ = σ JY K, and T = S ∪ S′. Since S and S′ are
disjoint, we have
#T (Y ∧X) = #S′(Y )#S(X)
#T (A ∧ Y ∧X) = #S′(Y )#S (A ∧X)
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and hence A | X = A | Y ∧X.
R4. Choose (P,≤P) to be (Q01,≤). Suppose that X is satisfiable and let
S = σ JA,B,XK. If A ≺X B then all truth assignments satisfying both A
and X also satisfy B, and there is some truth assignment satisfying both B
and X that does not satisfy A. Hence #S (A ∧X) < #S (B ∧X), yielding
A | X < B | X.
9. Discussion
9.1. The classical definition of probability
The classical definition of probability goes back to Cardano in the mid 16th
Century [4, Chapter 14]; perhaps its clearest statement was given by Laplace
[15]:
The probability of an event is the ratio of the number of cases favor-
able to it, to the number of possible cases, when there is nothing to
make us believe that one case should occur rather than any other,
so that these cases are, for us, equally possible.
This definition fell out of favor with the rise of both frequentist and subjective
interpretations of probability. Theorem 14 takes us back to the beginnings of
probability theory, validating the classical definition and sharpening it. We can
now say that a “possible case” is simply a truth assignment satisfying the premise
X. The phrase “these cases are, for us, equally possible,” which arguably makes
the definition circular, may simply be dropped as unnecessary. The phrase
“there is nothing to make us believe that one case should occur rather than
any other” means that we possess no additional information that, if conjoined
with our premise, would expand the satisfying truth assignments by differing
multiplicities.
We shall illustrate this subtle but important point with Bertrand’s “Box
Paradox” [2]. There are three identical boxes in a row, each with two drawers.
One of the boxes, call it GG, has gold coins in both drawers; one box, call it SS,
has silver coins in both drawers; and the remaining box, call it GS, has a gold
coin in one drawer and a silver coin in the other. Not knowing which is which,
you open the first drawer of the second box, and observe that it contains a gold
coin; what is the probability that the other drawer also holds a gold coin?
This problem is often resolved by appeal to Bayes’ Rule, yielding a prob-
ability of 2/3. Let’s apply Theorem 14 instead. A naïve analysis, using only
information about the second box itself, gives a probability of 1/2: the second
box must be either GG or GS (two cases), and since the first drawer contains
a gold coin, the second drawer also contains a gold coin only if the second box
is GG (one case). But this ignores the (seemingly irrelevant) information we
have about the first and third boxes. Table 1 gives an exhaustive list of all
possible cases when the other boxes are included. We see that the case “second
box is GS” gets expanded into two cases, while the case “second box is GG”
gets expanded into four cases, thereby invalidating the naïve analysis. Using
the expanded table gives the correct answer of 2/3.
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D11 D12 D21 D22 D31 D32
G G G S S S
S S G S G G
G S G G S S
S G G G S S
S S G G G S
S S G G S G
Table 1: Tabulation of all possible cases in Bertrand’s “Box Paradox.” Dij means drawer j of
box i.
9.2. Uniform versus non-uniform probabilities
One concern about Theorem 14 may be that it mandates the uniform dis-
tribution on Ω, the induced sample space of truth assignments satisfying the
premise X. But what other reasonable option is there? Remember that the
premise X contains all the information to which we have access in determining
our probability distribution. There is no implicit third argument to the plausi-
bility function that varies from one problem domain to another. Ω is just the
reification of X as a set—X tells us that one of the elements of Ω is the correct
description of the situation, and that is all it tells us. It gives us no information
by which we could favor one of these possibilities over another.
Yet non-uniform distributions are the norm in practical applications of prob-
ability theory, and one may ask where they come from. The “Box Paradox”
example illustrates one answer: via marginalization. A uniform distribution at
the finest level of granularity can correspond to a nonuniform distribution at
coarser levels obtained by considering the induced sample space for some subset
of the symbols in σ JA,XK.
For a more complete answer, let’s consider Carnap’s objection to the uniform
distribution. He defines a confirmation function c† for LN based on a uniform
distribution over state-descriptions, and notes that if a1, . . . , ak, ak+1 are distinct
individual constants and pi is a monadic predicate (property), then
c† (pi (ak+1) , pi (a1) ∧ · · · ∧ pi (ak)) = 1
2
for any k < N . He concludes [5, p. 565],
Thus the choice of c† as the degree of confirmation would be tan-
tamount to the principle never to let our past experiences influence
our expectations for the future.
Yet Carnap encounters this problem with c† for precisely the same reason that
he cannot find a uniquely determined confirmation function. As Jaynes writes
[13, p. 279],
Carnap was seeking the general inductive rule (i.e., the rule by which,
given the record of past results, one can make the best possible
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prediction of future ones). But. . . he never rises to the level of
seeing that different inductive rules correspond to different prior
information. It seems to us obvious. . . that this is the primary
fact controlling induction, without which the problem cannot even
be stated, much less solved; there is no ‘general inductive rule.’ Yet
neither the term ‘prior information’ nor the concept ever appears in
Carnap’s exposition.
This prior information belongs in the premise, and Carnap chooses not to include
it there, as discussed in Section 2.3 and Section 3.4.
As an example of such prior information, consider Carnap’s proposed confir-
mation function c∗ and associated measure function m∗, for a language having
a single monadic predicate pi. Let us write xi for the atomic sentence pi (ai),
where ai is the i-th individual constant. Then m∗ is equivalent to defining the
joint distribution
θ ∼ Uniform(0, 1)
xi ∼ Bernoulli(θ) independently for all i
and marginalizing out θ. That is, give θ a uniform distribution over the interval
(0, 1), then independently give each xi a probability θ of being true.
We now construct a propositional formula that expresses an arbitarily close
approximation of this prior information. Let I and K be large, positive integers.
Consider the xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ I, as propositional symbols. Let hk, 0 ≤ k ≤ K, have
the intended interpretation “θ = k/K.” Let us imagine that individual i may
be in any of K distinct fine-grained states, and let sij , 1 ≤ j ≤ K, have the
intended interpretation that individual i is in state j. Finally, define X to be
the conjunction of the following (K2 +K + 1)I + 1 formulas:
〈h0, . . . , hK〉
〈si1, . . . , siK〉 for 1 ≤ i ≤ I
hk ∧ sij → lijk for 1 ≤ i ≤ I, 1 ≤ j ≤ K, 0 ≤ k ≤ K
where
lijk =
{
xi if j ≤ k
¬xi if j > k.
That is, exactly one of the hk is true; for each i, exactly one of the sij is true; and
if hk is true then each xi is true in k out of the K possible states for individual
i. Using Theorem 14 we then have
P (xi | hk ∧X) = k/K for all i independently
P (hk | X) = 1/ (k + 1) .
This illustrates the general lesson: non-uniform probabilities arise by introduc-
ing latent variables, including in the premise information that links the latent
variables to observables, and then marginalizing out latent variables.
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9.3. Infinite domains
How might one extend these results to infinite domains, which are required
for the bulk of practical applications of probability theory? Jaynes proposes a
finite sets policy [13, p. 43]:
It is very important to note that our consistency theorems have been
established only for probabilities assigned on finite sets of proposi-
tions. In principle, every problem must start with such finite-set
probabilities; extension to infinite sets is permitted only when this
is the result of a well-defined and well-behaved limiting process from
a finite set.
In the same vein, he writes [13, p. 663],
In probability theory, it appears that the only safe procedure known
at present is to derive our results first by strict application of the
rules of probability theory on finite sets of propositions; then, af-
ter the finite-set result is before us, observe how it behaves as the
number of propositions increases indefinitely.
As an example, consider P
(
y < (1− x)2 | x, y ∈ [0, 1) ∧ y < x2
)
. We can con-
sider this to be the limiting value of P (An | Xn) as n→∞, where the queries
An and premises Xn are defined as follows:
1. Symbols ai and bi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are intended to mean i − 1 ≤ nx < i
and i− 1 ≤ ny < i respectively.
2. Let An be
∨
(i,j)∈K (ai ∧ bj) where K =
{
(i, j) : j/n ≤ (1− i/n)2
}
.
3. Let Xn be
∨
(i,j)∈L (ai ∧ bj) where L =
{
(i, j) : j/n ≤ (i/n)2
}
.
Figure 9.1 illustrates Xn ∧ An in black and Xn ∧ ¬An in gray for n = 30. As
n→∞, An tends in the limit to the desired query “y < (1− x)2” and Xn tends
in the limit to the desired premise “y < x2,” with x, y ∈ [0, 1) implicit in the
problem encoding.
Though straightforward, it would be tedious to have to explicitly construct
the limiting process and find the limiting value every time we considered a
probability involving an infinite domain. Modern probability theory is based on
measure theory, so it should be no surprise that measure theory provides the
tools to automate this process of constructing a sequence of finite approxima-
tions that converge to a limit. We will not attempt to provide a full account of
this large topic. By way of illustration, however, we will discuss one particularly
simple case. We only sketch things out here; see Appendix Appendix A for more
details.
Consider the Cantor set of infinite binary sequences Bω, where B = {0, 1}.
Enumerating the elements of S as s1, s2, . . ., we can consider Bω to be the set
of truth assignments on S if we identify a truth assignment ρ with the infinite
sequence w such that wi = ρ (si) for all i. We write C and µC for the Borel
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Figure 9.1: Approximating P
(
y < (1− x)2 | y < x2
)
with n = 30
σ-algebra on Bω and Borel measure on C respectively, which may be considered
a uniform distribution over Bω. Defining
[A] = {w ∈ Bω : w satisfies A}
for any A ∈ Φ (S), and
Pr
(
A˜; X˜, µ
)
=
µ
(
A˜ ∩ X˜
)
µ
(
X˜
)
for any two measurable sets A˜, X˜ and measure µ with µ
(
X˜
)
> 0, we find that
P (A | X) = Pr ([A]; [X], µC) .
Finally, Theorem 26 (Appendix Appendix A) states that for any measurable
sets A˜, X˜ ∈ C with µC
(
X˜
)
> 0 there exists a sequence of formulas Ai ∈ Φ (S)
and Xi ∈ Φ+ (S) such that
µC
(
[Ai]4A˜
)
→ 0
µC
(
[Xi]4X˜
)
→ 0
P (Ai | Xi)→ Pr
(
A˜; X˜, µC
)
as i → ∞, where 4 stands for set difference. That is, Jaynes’s “well-defined
and well-behaved limiting process” is guaranteed to exist under the conditions
of the Theorem, and Pr
(
A˜; X˜, µC
)
is the limiting probability.
Now we turn to the space Ω = Bm × [0, 1)n. We write D for the powerset
of Bm (the maximal σ-algebra on Bm) and define µD(A˜) =
∣∣∣A˜∣∣∣ /2m for A˜ ∈ D.
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We write B and µB for the Borel σ-algebra on [0, 1)n and Borel measure on B,
respectively. Let A = σ (D × B) be the product σ-algebra of D and B, and let
µA = µD × µB be the product measure of µD and µB. The measure µA may
be considered a uniform distribution over Bm× [0, 1)n, with µA
(
A˜× B˜
)
being∣∣∣A˜∣∣∣ /2m times the n-dimensional hypervolume of B˜.
The set B∗1ω of binary sequences ending in an infinite sequence of 1’s is a
measurable set of measure 0. Let us define I = Bω \B∗1ω to be all infinite binary
sequences except this measure-0 set. Define the function f : I→ Ω as
f (w) = (f0(w), r (f1(w)) , . . . , r (fn(w)))
f0(w) = w1 · · ·wm
fj(w) = v1v2 · · · where vi = wm+ι(i,j), for j 6= 0
r(v) =
∞∑
i=1
2−ivi
ι(i, j) = j + (i− 1)n.
That is, applying the mapping f amounts to interpreting symbol sm+ι(i,j), for
i ≥ 1 and 1 ≤ j ≤ n, as the i-th bit in the infinite binary expansion of xj ∈ [0, 1),
or more precisely, as the proposition “
⌊
2ixj
⌋
mod 2 = 1.” We interleave n
infinite sequences into one sequence by mapping index i of sequence j to index
ι(i, j) of the combined sequence. Using symbols sm+1 through sm+ι(k,n) we can
express any subspace of [0, 1)n at a granularity of hypercubes of length 2−k on
each side, and we can make this granularity as fine as desired by choosing k
sufficiently large.
The function f is a bijection between I and Ω. (We excluded B∗1ω to ensure
this, as dyadic rationals m/2n have two possible binary expansions.) Further-
more, both f and f−1 are measurable: f−1(A) ∈ C and f−1(A) ⊆ I whenever
A ⊆ A, and f(B) ∈ A whenever B ∈ C and B ⊆ I. Finally, f is measure-
preserving: µC
(
f−1(A)
)
= µA (A) whenever A ∈ A. This guarantees that
Pr
(
A˜; X˜, µA
)
= Pr
(
f−1
(
A˜
)
; f−1
(
X˜
)
, µC
)
.
Therefore, we can apply Theorem 26 and find that for any measurable sets
A˜, X˜ ∈ A with µA
(
X˜
)
> 0 there exist sequences of formulas Ai and Xi, with
Xi satisfiable, such that
µC
(
[Ai]4f−1
(
A˜
))
→ 0
µC
(
[Xi]4f−1
(
X˜
))
→ 0
P (Ai | Xi)→ Pr
(
A˜; X˜, µA
)
as i→∞.
32
In the example given at the beginning of this section, we have m = 0, n = 2,
and
A˜ =
{
(x, y) ∈ [0, 1)2 : y < (1− x)2}
X˜ =
{
(x, y) ∈ [0, 1)2 : y < x2} .
The above results tell us that we don’t need to explicitly construct the sequence
of approximating formulas for this example; it is guaranteed to exist, and the
limiting probability is
Pr
(
A˜; X˜, µA
)
=
∫ 1
0
min
(
x2, (1− x)2
)
dx∫ 1
0
x2dx
=
1
4
.
As another example, let us revisit and generalize the inductive model de-
scribed in Section 9.2:
θ ∼ Distr (F )
xi ∼ Bernoulli(θ) independently for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I
where Distr(F ) is the distribution on the unit interval with cdf F , which we
take to be continuous (and hence invertible). Doing a change of variables and
augmenting with latent variables si, the above is equivalent to
p ∼ Uniform(0, 1)
θ = F−1(p)
si ∼ Uniform(0, 1)
xi =
{
1 if si < θ
0 otherwise
after marginalizing out p and s. We have independent uniform distributions on
p and each si, plus equations relating each xi to p and si; hence the above is
equivalent to using as premise the measurable set
X˜ =
{
(x, p, s) ∈ BI × [0, 1)1+I : xi = 1⇔ si < F−1 (p) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I
}
,
again using the σ-algebra A and measure µA, with m = I and n = I + 1. For
any measurable A˜ we are again guaranteed that Pr
(
A˜; X˜, µA
)
is the limiting
probability obtained from a sequence of approximating formulas Ai and Xi.
This is not a complete solution to handling infinite problem domains. For
instance, in the example above we used BI (with finite I) instead of Bω, because
µA
(
X˜
)
→ 0 as I → ∞. In addition, the measure µC on C and encoding of
real numbers used above works well for a bounded interval like [0, 1) but does
not suffice for unbounded intervals, such as all of R. For such cases we need
alternative measures on C and corresponding analogs to Theorem 26, along with
alternative encodings for these domains.
Other work that remains to be done on this topic includes the following:
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1. Finding a general method of constructing the needed sequence of approx-
imating formulas for any computable probability measure [10, 22].
2. Extending our language of propositional formulas to express measurable
sets beyond just the cylinder sets, while ensuring that P (A | X) remains
computable, as is appropriate for a logical system.
We have made some initial investigations of these open issues and believe that
they can be resolved.
10. Conclusion
We have strengthened the case for probability theory as the uniquely deter-
mined extension of classical propositional logic to a logic of plausible reasoning.
Our proof relies on a small and simple set of requirements such a logic must
satisfy. These requirements are harder to dispute than those of previous such
efforts because every one of the requirements is motivated by a desire to retain
in our extended logic some property of CPL. A crucial distinction between our
approach and similar previous work is that A | X depends only on the explicit
arguments A and X, and not on any other domain-specific or problem-specific
information; any such relevant information must be included in the premise X.
This makes the plausibility function a legitimate analog of the logical conse-
quence relation: the truth or falsity of X |= A likewise depends only on X and
A, and not on any implicit domain-specific or problem-specific information.
R2 (invariance under definition of new symbols) in conjunction with R1 (log-
ical equivalence) turns out to have far-reaching implications. It yields invariance
under renaming of propositional symbols and, in fact, a fully general invariance
under change-of-variable transformations. Most importantly, it implies that
A | X is a function only of #S (A ∧X) and #S(X) for any S containing all the
symbols used in A and X. R3 (invariance under addition of irrelevant informa-
tion) excludes Carnap’s system, which comes pre-supplied with dependencies
between propositions rather than letting any dependencies be specified in the
premise. Adding R3 implies that A | X is a function of the ratio of #S (A ∧X)
to #S(X).
Finally, with R4 we made use of the underappreciated fact that CPL al-
ready comes equipped with an inherent plausibility ordering on propositions,
for any given premise. The invariances of R1–R3 “stitch together” these partial
orderings for distinct premises, and we find that we have an order-preserving
isomorphism P between the set of plausibilities P and the set of rational prob-
abilities Q01. The numeric value we find for P (A | X) recreates the classical
definition of probability, but in a sharper, clearer form with the troublesome
circularity excised, and as a theorem rather than as a definition. The “possible
cases” are identified as truth assignments satisfying the premise, and the mean-
ing of “equally possible cases” is simply that we have no additional information
that would expand the satisfying truth assignments by differing multiplicities.
We addressed two possible concerns about our result: that it seems to al-
low only uniform probabilities, and that it yields probabilities only for finite
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domains. We showed how non-uniform probabilities arise via the introduction
of latent variables, along with information in the premise linking these latent
variables to the observables. Following Jaynes, we proposed that probabilities
for infinite domains be obtained via a well-defined and well-behaved limiting
process, and demonstrated how measure theory can automate the construction
of such limiting processes in at least some cases.
Appendix A. Measure Theory
Appendix A.1. Some results from measure theory
We assume the reader is already familiar with the basic concepts of measure
theory: an algebra, a σ-algebra, a measurable set, the σ-algebra σ(A) generated
by an algebra A, a measurable function, a measure on an algebra or σ-algebra,
and a σ-finite measure. Billingsley [3] and Tao [19] are good references. Here
we highlight some results we will use.
A measure on an algebra A can always be consistently extended to a measure
on σ (A) [3, Theorem 11.3]:
Theorem 17. If µ is a measure on an algebra A then µ extends to a measure
on σ (A), that is, there exists a measure µ′ on σ (A) such that µ(A) = µ′(A) for
all A ∈ A. If µ is σ-finite then µ′ is unique, and is also σ-finite.
In many cases of interest the elements of a σ-algebra can be approximated
arbitrarily closely by sets from the generating algebra [3, Theorem 11.4]:
Theorem 18. If A is an algebra on Ω, µ is a σ-finite measure on σ (A), and
B ∈ σ (A) with µ (B) < ∞, then for every  > 0 there exists some A ∈ A such
that µ (A4B) < .
We use the following measure-related properties of set differences A4B,
which we state without proof:
Property 19. For any measure µ on an algebra A and any A,B ∈ A,
|µ(A)− µ(B)| ≤ µ (A4B) .
Property 20. For any measure µ on an algebra A and any A1, A2, X1, X2 ∈ A,
µ ((A1 ∩X1)4 (A2 ∩X2)) ≤ µ (A14A2) + µ (X14X2) .
Appendix A.2. Constructing the “well-defined and well-behaved limiting process”
To avoid confusion between propositional formulas and measurable sets, in
this section we will generally decorate the names of measurable sets with a tilde
(A˜, B˜, etc.) and leave the names of propositional formulas undecorated (A, B,
etc.)
The Borel σ-algebra and Borel measure for the Cantor set Bω are constructed
as follows:
35
Definition 21. A cylinder set is a subset of Bω of the form cyl (n,C) , CBω
for some C ⊆ Bn. C0 is the collection of all cylinder sets. This set is an algebra,
and the Borel σ-algebra for Bω is C , σ (C0), the σ-algebra generated by C0.
Cylinder sets are the basis of a topology on Bω in which the open sets are
any finite or countable union of cylinder sets, and this is why we call C the Borel
σ-agebra for Bω.
Definition 22. The Borel measure for C is the measure µC such that
µC (cyl (n,C)) = 2−n |C|
for any n ≥ 0 and C ⊆ Bn.
The definition above is unambiguous because cyl(n,C) = cyl(n + m,C ′) if
and only if C ′ = CBm. Note that µC is trivially σ-finite, since Bω itself is a
cylinder set and µC (Bω) is finite. By Theorem 17 µC is uniquely defined once
we define its value on cylinder sets.
Let us enumerate the elements of S as s1, s2, . . . and identify a sequence
w ∈ Bω with the truth assignment ρ on S such that ρ (si) = wi for all i; then
every propositional formula corresponds to a cylinder set:
Definition 23. If A is a propositional formula then [A] is the set of w ∈ Bω
that satisfy A (considered as truth assignments.)
Note that [A] = cyl(n,C) and µC ([A]) = 2−n#S(A), where σ JAK ⊆ S =
{s1, . . . , sn} and C is the set of w ∈ Bn that satisfy A. Likewise, every cylinder
set corresponds to a propositional formula:
Lemma 24. For any cylinder set A˜ there is a formula A ∈ Φ (S) such that
A˜ = [A].
Proof. Let A˜ = cyl (n,C) and define the propositional formula A as
A =
∨
c∈C
Ac
Ac =
n∧
i=1
Li,ci
Li,0 = ¬si
Li,1 = si
It is straightforward to see that [A] = A˜.
We can define an analog to P (A | X), but for measurable sets:
Definition 25. Let A be a σ-algebra and µ a measure on A. For any A˜, X˜ ∈ A
with µ
(
X˜
)
> 0, define
Pr
(
A˜; X˜, µ
)
=
µ
(
A˜ ∩ X˜
)
µ
(
X˜
) .
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We then find that
P (A | X) = 2
−n#S (A ∧X)
2−n#S (X)
= Pr ([A]; [X], µC)
where we choose n to be large enough that σ JA,XK ⊆ S = {s1, . . . , sn}. We use
this fact to show that Jaynes’s “well-defined and well-behaved limiting process”
is guaranteed to exist for measurable sets:
Theorem 26. Let A˜, X˜ ∈ C, with µC
(
X˜
)
> 0. Then there exists a sequence
of formulas Ai ∈ Φ (S) and Xi ∈ Φ+ (S) such that
1. limi→∞ µC
(
[Ai]4A˜
)
= 0.
2. limi→∞ µC
(
[Xi]4X˜
)
= 0.
3. limi→∞ P (Ai | Xi) = Pr
(
A˜; X˜, µC
)
.
Proof. Let i, i ≥ 1 be any decreasing sequence of positive numbers whose limit
is 0, with 1 < µC
(
X˜
)
. Using Theorem 18 and Lemma 24 we can define
Ai = some A ∈ Φ (S) such that µC
(
[A]4A˜
)
< i
Xi = some X ∈ Φ (S) such that µC
(
[X]4X˜
)
< i
1 and 2 in the theorem statement follow directly from these definitions. From
Property 19 we have∣∣∣µC ([Xi])− µC (X˜)∣∣∣ ≤ µC ([X]4X˜) < i < µC (X˜)
and so µC ([Xi]) > 0, i.e., Xi is satisfiable. Property 19 also gives us
lim
i→∞
µC ([Xi]) = µC
(
X˜
)
.
Property 20 gives us
µC
(
[Ai ∧Xi]4
(
A˜ ∩ X˜
))
< 2i
and then Property 19 yields
lim
i→∞
µC ([Ai ∧Xi]) = µC
(
A˜ ∩ X˜
)
.
Finally we have
lim
i→∞
P (Ai | Xi) = lim
i→∞
µC ([Ai ∧Xi])
µC ([Xi])
=
µC
(
A˜ ∩ X˜
)
µC
(
X˜
) = Pr(A˜; X˜, µC) .
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